8a866676-4d9c-4cd7-9b7d-cad494aa19a820260404073828Ubiquity Presstech@ubiquitypress.comRUA Metadata ExporterLowellDittmerUniversity of California, Berkeleyhttps://ror.org/01an7q238Political ScienceFitful EmbraceChina’s relation to Taiwan has been in constant contention since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the creation of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) exile regime on the island two months later. The island’s autonomous sovereignty has continually been challenged, initially because of the KMT’s insistence that it continue to represent not just Taiwan but all of China—and later because Taiwan refused to cede sovereignty to the then-dominant power that had arisen on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. One thing that makes Taiwan so politically difficult and yet so intellectually fascinating is that it is not merely a security problem, but a ganglion of interrelated puzzles. The optimistic hope of the Ma Ying-jeou administration for a new era of peace and cooperation foundered on a landslide victory by the Democratic Progressive Party, which has made clear its intent to distance Taiwan from China’s political embrace. The Taiwanese are now waiting with bated breath as the relationship tautens. Why did détente fail, and what chance does Taiwan have without it? Contributors to this volume focus on three aspects of the evolving quandary: nationalistic identity, social economy, and political strategy.“Provides essential background for an understanding of both why the issues between Taiwan and China remain difficult to resolve and why that lack of resolution poses a potential threat to peace in the western Pacific area.” STEVEN GOLDSTEIN, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard UniversityLOWELL DITTMER is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is editor in chief of the journal Asian Survey and the author of Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, China’s Quest for National Identity, China Under Modernization, and South Asia’s Nuclear Crisis.China’s relation to Taiwan has been in constant contention since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the creation of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) exile regime on the island two months later. The island’s autonomous sovereignty has continually been challenged, initially because of the KMT’s insistence that it continue to represent not just Taiwan but all of China—and later because Taiwan refused to cede sovereignty to the then-dominant power that had arisen on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. One thing that makes Taiwan so politically difficult and yet so intellectually fascinating is that it is not merely a security problem, but a ganglion of interrelated puzzles. The optimistic hope of the Ma Ying-jeou administration for a new era of peace and cooperation foundered on a landslide victory by the Democratic Progressive Party, which has made clear its intent to distance Taiwan from China’s political embrace. The Taiwanese are now waiting with bated breath as the relationship tautens. Why did détente fail, and what chance does Taiwan have without it? Contributors to this volume focus on three aspects of the evolving quandary: nationalistic identity, social economy, and political strategy.“Provides essential background for an understanding of both why the issues between Taiwan and China remain difficult to resolve and why that lack of resolution poses a potential threat to peace in the western Pacific area.” STEVEN GOLDSTEIN, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard UniversityLOWELL DITTMER is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is editor in chief of the journal Asian Survey and the author of Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, China’s Quest for National Identity, China Under Modernization, and South Asia’s Nuclear Crisis.10032017978-0-520-29598-8978-0-520-96870-7978-0-520-96870-7978-0-520-96870-7University of California PressCaliforniahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/10.1525/luminos.38https://www.luminosoa.org/books/e/10.1525/luminos.38https://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/be07c0b4-bb95-45c4-bf0a-5d39a43b1984.pdfhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/be07c0b4-bb95-45c4-bf0a-5d39a43b1984.pdfLowellDittmerUniversity of California, Berkeleyhttps://ror.org/01an7q238This book examines Taiwan-China relations from three analytical perspectives: (1) ideational; (2) economic; and (3) strategic. These perspectives are analyzed by distinguished scholars from Taiwan, China, Hong Kong and the United States. Each of these perspectives is necessary to help us comprehend the intricate cross-strait puzzle, characterized by deepening economic interdependence and a widening identity gap.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.ahttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.ahttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/36072a85-54f4-4833-b059-e82e7dd7f216.pdfYi-huahJiangCity University of Hong Konghttps://ror.org/03q8dnn23Liberal Arts and Social SciencesIn the chapter, I review three popular methods of measuring national identity in Taiwan -- the Chinese/Taiwanese dichotomy, the unification/independence dichotomy, and the "Chinese Nationalist vs. Taiwanese Nationalist" dichotomy. I argue none is perfect in illustrating the political identity of the people. I then recommend a fourth method by delineating one's compatriots and homeland. Measuring in this way, we find that Taiwan's national identity is not as divisive as many researchers describe, and that national identity per se is not a real issue in Taiwan. Instead, the question of how to deal with the "one China principle" embedded in the "1992 consensus" is the real challenge. While Ma Ying-Jeou endorsed the "1992 consensus," Tsai Ying-Wen refuses to continue the policy and therefore makes the cross-straits relations more nervous than before. Measures for easing the tension between Taiwan, USA and China are badly needed.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.bhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.bhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/527211bf-0aa2-453e-9791-7c993c6c20ff.pdfJean-PierreCabestanHong Kong Baptist Universityhttps://ror.org/0145fw131Government and International StudiesTaiwan’s democratization has directly contributed to the emergence of Taiwanese identity and Taiwan nationalism. In spite of Ma Ying-jeou’s attempt between 2008 and 2016 to restore a more traditional Chinese and Republic of China (ROC) cultural and political identity, the Taiwanese civic identity has continued to consolidate. Ms. Tsai Ing-wen’s election and the DPP’s return to power in 2016 have confirmed this overarching trend. But at the same time, we are witnessing a diversification of the ways to be Taiwanese, leading some to associate their identity with the local culture, the building of a new Taiwanese nation and the quest for formal independence from China and others to accommodate their identity with a democratized, sovereign and de facto independent ROC on Taiwan.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.chttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.chttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/6d309da6-93e4-49b7-b8fe-0b9ed9384b1b.pdfShuKengZhejiang Universityhttps://ror.org/00a2xv884SociologyEmmyRuihua LinShanghai University of Finance and Economicshttps://ror.org/00wtvfq62School of Public Economics and AdministrationThis chapter seeks to answer the question: Why do Taiwanese settle and blend into Chinese society but persistently refuse to identify themselves as Chinese or even assume a less exclusive Taiwan identity? We argue that the differences between the two cultures frustrate the enthusiasm of the Taiwanese to revise their Taiwan identity. With respect to the cultural influences, the living culture plays a role, in that Taiwanese settled in the Yangtze Delta are willing to consider themselves as the new Shanghainese or new Kunshan residents. But the key is political culture, since young Taiwanese growing up in a democratic society are generally less willing to accept themselves as the subjects of the PRC. Their ability to travel back and forth empowers these Taiwanese to hold on to their original identity. The study of the Taiwanese in China provides a critical case study for immigration under the context of globalization.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.dhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.dhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/5e777515-1f2c-470a-b7ed-6291d1cd7abf.pdfGangLinShanghai Jiao Tong Universityhttps://ror.org/0220qvk04School of International and Public AffairsWeixuWuTsinghua Universityhttps://ror.org/03cve4549Institute for Taiwan StudiesChinese national identity is both indigenous and reconstructive. The ancient concept of the Middle Kingdom has been enriched continuously. From 1949 to 1979, Chinese people in the mainland were educated to liberate the “miserable” people of Taiwan and bring the island back to its motherland. From 1979 onward, Taiwan’s developmental experience and increasing cross-strait civic exchanges have expanded mainlanders’ imagination of modernization and understanding of national identity. Facing a growing Taiwanese identity, regardless of power turnover between different parties on the island, reconstruction of Chinese national identity requires economic modernization and integration, mutual cultural exchange and assimilation, and reinterpretation of contemporary Chinese history on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. It also calls for improvement of public governance and political engineering in the mainland.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.ehttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.ehttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/a462aa80-01eb-4ac8-a9de-5cd6dfbfb391.pdfRou-lanChenNational Sun Yat-sen UniversityPolitical EconomyThis paper hinges on why the once unimportant Diaoyu islands became an indivisible part of Republic of China in 1972 for the young generation in Taiwan. It also makes a contrast with China, by exploring why the authorities in China, for three decades, downplayed the issue regarding the Diaoyu islands and suddenly decided to claim Diaoyu as an inseparable territory of China. This paper goes further to ask why Chinese youth nationalism concerning the Diaoyu islands disputes erupted in 2012. As demonstrated by content analysis, it was ambivalence toward the CCP that eventually galvanized the post-1980 generation to advance from virtual reality to radical action. It also indicates structural factors that facilitated raging youth nationalism in China. Finally, this study points out that interactions between the Internet and globalization precipitated the resurgence of outraged nationalism in 2012, as nationalism is always affirmed against a foreign enemy.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.fhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.fhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/785b380e-a1dd-45ea-9c43-8372c6c0f006.pdfChih-shianLiouNational Chengchi Universityhttps://ror.org/03rqk8h36Graduate Institute of East Asian StudiesAn increasing body of research focuses on the development of state capitalism across different parts of the globe as a response to the new economic environment brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. The literature has identified various forms of state capitalist regimes, nonetheless it has yet to offer an explanation of why the variations exist. Focusing on state capitalism in Taiwan and China, this chapter finds that resources available to leaders when they engage in the cultivation of the state capitalist regimes condition the main agent of economic development and thus the ownership structures in the domestic markets. The assistance from the U.S. and the commitment to a liberal market explains the prevalence of small-and-medium-sized private firms under Taiwan’s model of state capitalism, while tensions with major powers and state ownership as one of the sources of CCP legitimacy account for the dominance of the SOE sector under China’s state capitalism.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.ghttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.ghttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/47f84841-5a2e-4a44-ab52-e21935d9f23c.pdfChung-minTsaiNational Chengchi Universityhttps://ror.org/03rqk8h36Political ScienceThe economic relationship between Taiwan and China has been getting closer due to increasing Taiwanese investment in China (TIC). By examining the data from both Taiwan and China, this chapter argues that TIC has been driven mainly by economic motivations and is barely affected by tumultuous political situations. The depoliticization of business characterizes TIC. Taishang have remained intact despite the political turbulence but been excluded from the domestic policy-making process. In recent years, TIC has been gradually declining due to a deteriorating investment environment. This chapter demonstrates that while the amount of TIC has been generally increasing over the past 25 years, the composition of TIC has radically changed due to both endogenous constraints and exogenous factors. TIC has been heavily influenced by the macroeconomic environment in China and that political struggles between Taiwan and China have not led to the transition of TIC.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.hhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.hhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/a4fe111d-0f29-4ec0-b6fc-d7c07b8bd58e.pdfTse-KangLengNational Chengchi Universityhttps://ror.org/03rqk8h36Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica (IPSAS)This chapter discusses whether Taiwan can still maintain its existing position in cross-Strait economic relations within the new context of the rise of China’s economic power. This chapter argues that Taiwan’s OEM model of manufacturing is now facing a dual threat in the form of shrinking profit margins and the rise of Chinese domestic manufacturers. The OBM model of IT production is constrained by the lack of marketing and global logistics capabilities. Moreover, Taiwan’s domestic politics deter the interflows of advanced talent between Taiwan and China. The advantage of “made in China, by Taiwan” model of IT manufacturing is gradually diminishing. All in all, the China factor will be a key component for Taiwan’s global strategies of development. Understanding the risks and opportunities of the rise of China from a global instead of bilateral aspect will help illuminate the roadmap of Taiwan’s future growth and prosperity.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.ihttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.ihttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/7ddc381b-94c4-4784-92af-5bebe14bc51c.pdfYou-tienHsingUniversity of California, Berkeleyhttps://ror.org/01an7q238Center for Chinese StudiesIn this paper I discussed Taiwan’s changing state-societal relationship in the era of post developmental state, and the dynamics among information technology, oppositional politics and social activism. The paradox of this triangular relationship is found in the multiparty-democratic Taiwan where social mobilizers claimed an apolitical stance in order to earn public trust. I then compared this dynamism with China, where social media participants resorted to the state for restoration of public trust. The apolitical yet powerful, Taiwan-based international charity organization of Tzu-chi further illuminated the power of the apolitical by championing Taiwan’s otherwise much constrained diplomatic relationship internationally and with China.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.jhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.jhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/fe42fbdc-2465-4cdd-aba2-fe4b236e4fcd.pdfYu-ShanWuNational Taiwan Universityhttps://ror.org/05bqach95Institute of Political ScienceSqueezed by two great powers in competition, the medium and small countries between them have limited choices: pivot, hedger, and partner. Taiwan is one of the countries caught between the colliding titans and forced to adopt a position from the limited options. A similar structure is found in Eastern Europe where Russia collides with the West for dominance, and lesser powers there are forced to make decisions out of the same limited choices. This chapter first develops an analytical framework that combines the perspectives of rational choice of lesser powers and geopolitical fault lines. It then looks into Taiwan’s policy toward mainland China as an example of lesser country’s decision under great power competition. A cross-regional comparison is made with Ukraine. Finally, theoretical implications of the analysis are drawn from the above discussion.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.khttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.khttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/d5f2c9d4-7f83-4d8d-9477-28465e010b78.pdfPing-KueiChenNational Chengchi Universityhttps://ror.org/03rqk8h36Department of DiplomacyScott L.KastnerUniversity of Maryland, College Parkhttps://ror.org/047s2c258Department of Government and PoliticsWilliam L.ReedUniversity of MarylandDepartment of Government and PoliticsAs China’s rapid rise as an economic and—increasingly—military power dramatically alters the security landscape in East Asia, prominent voices in both Washington and Beijing have in recent years advocated a shift in their respective country’s approach to the US-Taiwan relationship. In the United States, several scholars and former officials have called for a reduced US security commitment to Taiwan, and in particular an end to arms sales to Taiwan. Proponents of this view suggest that a scaled back US commitment would pay dividends in terms of an improved US-China relationship. In the PRC, meanwhile, a number of voices have called for a tougher Chinese response to US arms sales—including the imposition of economic sanctions. This chapter critically evaluates both arguments, and concludes that both proposed policy shifts carry with them significant risks for the country that would initiate the change.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.lhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.lhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/bfc7d4f5-6358-4e65-9999-c2dd6cfbd6cc.pdfJingHuangLee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy1003201710.1525/luminos.38.mhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.mhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/2401a311-bece-42de-8e3e-622d6cc81e73.pdfSamuel C. Y.KuNational Sun Yat-sen UniversityThis paper takes a comparative perspective in examining China’s expansion strategy and Taiwan’s Southeast Asian survival strategy that has been unfolding since the turn of the century. It argues that China’s expansion strategy has established a relatively solid relationship with most of the Southeast Asian countries. It however, faces challenges affecting further expansion in the region. Although Taiwan would continue to face the challenges of political isolation and economic marginalization which could greatly impact its survival, its political democratization may allow for its continued survival in the international community. Given the recent democratic shift in Southeast Asia, Taiwan has won more support and friendship across the region than China has been able to keep up with.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.nhttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.nhttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/56506b02-33a7-4e1d-8f7b-12e8db19625f.pdfLowellDittmerUniversity of California, Berkeleyhttps://ror.org/01an7q238Political ScienceChina and Taiwan constitute one of the four nations divided by the Cold War. This division was intended to be only temporary, but became frozen into the bipolar Cold War structure. Yet reunification has been implanted into the vision of national self-realization in post-Liberation China and to some extent in Taiwan as well. Since the end of the Cold War mutual interest revived on both sides, but as the PRC overtook the island economically and militarily, the dream of reunification has begun to fade. This concluding chapter focuses on the question why.1003201710.1525/luminos.38.ohttps://www.luminosoa.org/chapters/e/10.1525/luminos.38.ohttps://www.luminosoa.org/books/43/files/5f742c2f-7ade-4866-a0c3-7830709ef533.pdf